We study implications of the choice of strategic variables, price or quantity, by firms in a duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit. We consider general demand and cost functions, and show that the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant in the...

We study the choice of strategic variables by firms in a duopoly in which two firms produce differentiated substitutable goods and each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit and the profit of the rival firm. We consider a two stage game such that in the...

We study the Stackelberg equilibrium in a symmetric duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit and the profit of the rival firm. We show that the equilibrium output and price of the good of the leader and those of...

We analyze Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly with more than two firms in which the firms produce differentiated substitutable goods and seek to maximize their relative profits instead of their absolute profits. Assuming linear demand functions and constant marginal costs...

We analyze Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly in which the firms produce differentiated substitutable goods and seek to maximize their relative profits instead of their absolute profits. Assuming linear demand functions and constant marginal costs we show the following...

We study the relation between a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium in an \emph{asymmetric} duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit and the profit of the rival firm. Both demand and cost functions are...

We consider a simple model of the choice of strategic variables under relative profit maximization by firms in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated substitutable goods such that there are three firms, Firm 1, 2 and 3, demand functions are linear and symmetric, marginal costs are constant,...

In this note we investigate the relation between a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium in a duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit and the profit of the rival firm. We will show that when firms...

Bridges(1992) has constructively shown the existence of continuous demand function for consumers with continuous, uniformly rotund preference relations. We extend this result to the case of multi-valued demand correspondence. We consider a weakly uniformly rotund and monotonic preference...

We present an analysis about adoption of new technology by firms in a duopoly with differentiated goods under absolute and relative profit maximization. Technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, for example, for education of its staff. Under absolute profit...