While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, the possibility of reverting to violence to appropriate the resource destroys the incentives to cooperate, because of the expectation of conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted....

Professional economists rarely write on questions of genocide. This surprises because a workhorse tool of the economics discipline concerns the analysis of behavior that takes place under constraints. All parties in genocide—perpetrators, victims, and third parties—face cost and resource...

In this paper, we consider a model that suggests that the theory of exchange with asymmetric information seems suitable to provide a possible explanation model of occurrence and duration of civil wars. We show that although civil conflicts are not Pareto optimal ex post they may be Pareto...

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conflicts. This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes whether issue linkages can be used as a form of...

The configuration of the cold war determines institutional quality. Countries pertaining to the block of the West display a negative link with bureaucratic development, lack of corruption, credibility of governments and others. Results are maintained even after controlling for regional and...

In this paper I examine the paradoxical role of language in conflict situations. Support the war and negotiation belong to a game of "speech acts" structured by a double metonymic and metaphorical relationship. That metaphorical relationship between both conceptualizes negotiation as a condensed...

We intend to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find that individual investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy ballot. Since individual investors are not so skillful as institutional investors, we summarize that...

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Similar to results in Lazear and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance approaches zero, the...