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Bonein, Aurélie; Serra, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

Gender differences are often observed in real life-situations. We implement an experiment on the investment game which … explores the influence of knowledge of partner's gender in trust and reciprocity by means of two treatments of information: the … first one, without knowledge of partner's gender and the second treatment where gender's partner is common knowledge. A …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005787126

Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding

Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976975

Culture and the Gender Gap in Competitive Inclination: Evidence from the Communist Experiment in China

Zhang, Y. Jane - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

minorities. Using an economic experiment, this study compares the gender gap in competitive inclination across three ethnic … groups in one county. The Han Chinese have no statistically significant gender gap while the patrilineal Yi women are … hypothesis that institutional changes can narrow the gender gap in competitive inclination. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113959

The Visible Hand: Finger ratio (2D:4D) and competitive behavior

Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we scan …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976978

Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities

Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We investigate a private value auction in which a single "entrant" on winning imposes a negative externality on two "regular" bidders. In an English auction, when all bidders are active "regulars" free ride, exiting before price reaches their value. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109670

Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions

Breitmoser, Yves - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

People overestimate the probability that others share their values or preferences. I introduce type projection equilibrium (TPE) to capture such projection in Bayesian games. TPE allows each player to believe his opponents share his type with intermediate probability \rho. After establishing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011167228

Endogenous Preferences and Conformity: Evidence From a Pilot Experiment

Beraldo, Sergio; Filoso, Valerio; Marco, Stimolo - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Conformity behavior, i.e. the agreement between an individual's choices and the prevailing behavior of a reference group, is a commonly observed phenomenon. Though some types of social interactions may give raise to specific incentives to adopt either a majoritarian or a contrarian behavior, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260935

Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Fischer, Sven; Guth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd; Zultan, Roi - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112622

Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation and Wealth Constraints

Chang, Wei-Shiun; Salmon, Timothy C.; Saral, Krista Jabs - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Renegotiation is a common practice in procurement auctions which allows for post-auction price adjustments and is nominally intended to deal with the problem that sellers might underestimate the eventual costs of a project during the auction. Using a combination of theory and experiments, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113750

Auctions with Positive Synergies: Experimental Evidence

Chow, YuenLeng; Yavas, Abdullah - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In a standard auction, bidders bid more aggressively when the number of bidders increases. However, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996, Games and Economic Behavior) show that when bidders have multiple-unit demand that generates positive synergies, bidders bid less aggressively as the number of bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789669