Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus,...

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We...

Experimental evidence and field data suggest that agents hold two seemingly unrelated biases: failure to account for the fact that the behavior of others reflects their private information (“winner's curse”), and a tendency to value a good more once it is owned (“endowment effect”). In...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive ability: more cognitively...

We study product differentiation on a Salop circle when firms relocate incrementally due to bounded rationality. We prove that, under common assumptions on demand, firms relocate only when two or more firms target the same niche. In any other case, there is no incentive for any firm to relocate...

This article evaluates Herbert A. Simon’s contribution to organization theory, placing special emphasis on the criterion of bounded rationality. Simon’s criticism of the orthodox version of organizational bureaucracy is interpreted and his analysis is extended to institutional economics. One...

Abstract Firms can exploit consumers' mistakes when facing complex purchasing decision problems but Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) argue that if at least some consumers disregard offers that are difficult to compare with others then firms will be forced into adopting common ways to present their...

Firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous-product market where uninformed consumers search for price information. Some uninformed consumers are local searchers who visit only one seller, possibly due to high search costs or bounded rationality; whereas others search sequentially with an...

The paper discusses how and why the theories of neo-classical economics are inadequate to provide a framework to human resource management and therefore must give way to dynamic gradual optimization procedure based on the principles of bounded rationality and satisficing behaviour in dealing...

Contingent charges for financial services, such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts, are often controversial. We study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers. We contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of...