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Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257415
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Partners contribute more to Public Goods than Strangers: Conditional Cooperation
Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Instituut - 1997
In a series of experiments, we compare a situation where the same group of four subjects plays 25 repetitions of a public good game (partners condition) to a situation where subjects play this game in changing group formations over 25 periods (strangers condition). We observe that, on aggregate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255474
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Members, Joiners, Free-riders, Supporters
Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255680
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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255768
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Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Firm Using a Market Mechanism
Ba, Sulin; Stallaert, Jan; Whinston, Andrew B. - In: Management Science 47 (2001) 9, pp. 1203-1219
There has been an extensive research literature on auctions, but recent developments in technology have resulted in new interest in auction mechanisms as a practical way of allocating resources. This paper presents a new double-auction mechanism to handle resource allocation for public goods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009218216
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Control without Deception
Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000
in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more … sensitive to free-riding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that … explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.<BR><BR> …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962
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Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000
We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974
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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137083
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When the Quality of a Nation triggers Emigration
Dalen, Hendrik P. van; Henkens, Kène - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
Why do people leave high-income countries with extensive welfare states? This article will examine what underlies the emigration intentions of native-born inhabitants of one industrialized country in particular: the Netherlands. To understand emigration from high-income countries we focus not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137297
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The Architecture of Participation: Does Code Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open Source Development Model?
Baldwin, Carliss Y.; Clark, Kim B. - In: Management Science 52 (2006) 7, pp. 1116-1127
This paper argues that the architecture of a codebase is a critical factor that lies at the heart of the open source development process. We define two observable properties of an architecture: (1) modularity and (2) option value. Developers can often make informed judgments about modularity and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191452