John C. Harsanyi's rejoinder to comments and replies to Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Sci. 28 (2) 113--120 and Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Reply to Professor Harsanyi. Management Sci. 28 (2) 124.

(This article originally appeared in Management Science, November 1967, Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 159--182, published by The Institute of Management Sciences.) The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some...

Parts I and II of this paper have described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. Two cases have been distinguished: consistent games in which there exists some basic probability distribution from which the players' subjective probability distributions can be...

The von Neumann-Morgenstern theory yields a determinate solution (a unique payoff vector) only for the two-person zero-sum game and some other special cases. But if we adopt a small number of additional rationality postulates we obtain determinate solutions for all known classes of games. The...

Part I of this paper has described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. It has been shown that, if the various players' subjective probability distributions satisfy a certain mutual-consistency requirement, then any given game with incomplete information will be...

The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the...

The paper argues that the von Neumann-Morgenstern definition of stable sets is unsatisfactory because it neglects the destabilizing effect of indirect dominance relations. This argument is supported both by heuristic considerations and by construction of a bargaining game B(G), formalizing the...

The paper extends Nash's theory of two-person bargaining games with fixed threats to bargaining situations with incomplete information. After defining such bargaining situations, a formal bargaining model (bargaining game) will be proposed for them. This bargaining game, regarded as...

The normative solution concepts of game theory try to provide a clear mathematical characterization of what it means to act rationally in a game where all players expect each other to act rationally. Kadane and Larkey reject the use of these normative solution concepts. Yet, this amounts to...