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Effect of Information Feedback on Bidder Behavior in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions

Adomavicius, Gediminas; Curley, Shawn P.; Gupta, Alok; … - In: Management Science 58 (2012) 4, pp. 811-830

Combinatorial auctions--in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods--can increase the economic efficiency of a … auctions, but the issue of cognitive complexity remains an unexplored barrier for the online marketplace. This study uses a … data-driven approach to explore how bidders react to the complexity in such auctions using three experimental feedback …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990581

Buying Beauty: On Prices and Returns in the Art Market

Renneboog, Luc; Spaenjers, Christophe - In: Management Science 59 (2013) 1, pp. 36-53

This paper investigates the price determinants and investment performance of art. We apply a hedonic regression analysis to a new data set of more than one million auction transactions of paintings and works on paper. Based on the resulting price index, we conclude that art has appreciated in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990590

When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from Herding on eBay

Simonsohn, Uri; Ariely, Dan - In: Management Science 54 (2008) 9, pp. 1624-1637

People often observe others' decisions before deciding themselves. Using eBay data for DVD auctions we explore the … consequences of neglecting nonsalient information when making such inferences. We show that bidders herd into auctions with more … bidding a given dollar amount are less likely to win low starting price auctions, and pay more for them when they do win …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191160

Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales

Hausch, Donald B. - In: Management Science 32 (1986) 12, pp. 1599-1610

Would a seller prefer to sell multiple objects through sequential or simultaneous auctions? Sequential auctions with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191582

A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service

Kelly, Frank; Steinberg, Richard - In: Management Science 46 (2000) 4, pp. 586-596

We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197637

On Optimal Competitive Contracting

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard - In: Management Science 33 (1987) 11, pp. 1481-1488

We present an example of risk neutral bid-taker and bidders in which the bid-taker obtains a greater expected revenue from auctioning an inefficient contract than from auctioning an efficient contract. This occurs because in going from the efficient contract to an inefficient (but almost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197692

Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time

Kittsteiner, Thomas; Moldovanu, Benny - In: Management Science 51 (2005) 2, pp. 236-248

We analyze the allocation of priority in queues via simple bidding mechanisms. In our model, the stochastically arriving customers are privately informed about their own processing time. They make bids upon arrival at a queue whose length is unobservable. We consider two bidding schemes that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197897

Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts

Arya, Anil; Demski, Joel; Glover, Jonathan; Liang, Pierre - In: Management Science 55 (2009) 5, pp. 752-762

A criticism of mechanism design theory is that the optimal mechanism designed for one environment can produce drastically different actions, outcomes, and payoffs in a second, even slightly different, environment. In this sense, the theoretically optimal mechanisms usually studied are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009198053

Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback

Chen-Ritzo, Ching-Hua; Harrison, Terry P.; Kwasnica, … - In: Management Science 51 (2005) 12, pp. 1753-1762

The majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single-attribute (price) format while providing constraints on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204216

Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types

Lovejoy, William S. - In: Management Science 52 (2006) 5, pp. 788-803

In some mechanism design problems, finite-type spaces may be natural ones to consider, yet the current literature is dominated by analyses of continuous-type spaces. This probably derives from the intellectual dominance of the early work in this area. Here we present an analysis of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204255