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Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions

Branzoli, Nicola - 2019

auction formats in public procurement. The difference-in-differences strategy used exploits a data set of auctions for public … works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions. We find that the use of first price auctions causes a … marked decline in both entry and subcontracting. We also find that the type of firms entering first price auctions changes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860644

Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales

Hausch, Donald B. - In: Management Science 32 (1986) 12, pp. 1599-1610

Would a seller prefer to sell multiple objects through sequential or simultaneous auctions? Sequential auctions with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191582

A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service

Kelly, Frank; Steinberg, Richard - In: Management Science 46 (2000) 4, pp. 586-596

We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197637

On Optimal Competitive Contracting

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard - In: Management Science 33 (1987) 11, pp. 1481-1488

We present an example of risk neutral bid-taker and bidders in which the bid-taker obtains a greater expected revenue from auctioning an inefficient contract than from auctioning an efficient contract. This occurs because in going from the efficient contract to an inefficient (but almost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197692

Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time

Kittsteiner, Thomas; Moldovanu, Benny - In: Management Science 51 (2005) 2, pp. 236-248

We analyze the allocation of priority in queues via simple bidding mechanisms. In our model, the stochastically arriving customers are privately informed about their own processing time. They make bids upon arrival at a queue whose length is unobservable. We consider two bidding schemes that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197897

Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts

Arya, Anil; Demski, Joel; Glover, Jonathan; Liang, Pierre - In: Management Science 55 (2009) 5, pp. 752-762

A criticism of mechanism design theory is that the optimal mechanism designed for one environment can produce drastically different actions, outcomes, and payoffs in a second, even slightly different, environment. In this sense, the theoretically optimal mechanisms usually studied are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009198053

Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback

Chen-Ritzo, Ching-Hua; Harrison, Terry P.; Kwasnica, … - In: Management Science 51 (2005) 12, pp. 1753-1762

The majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single-attribute (price) format while providing constraints on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204216

Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types

Lovejoy, William S. - In: Management Science 52 (2006) 5, pp. 788-803

In some mechanism design problems, finite-type spaces may be natural ones to consider, yet the current literature is dominated by analyses of continuous-type spaces. This probably derives from the intellectual dominance of the early work in this area. Here we present an analysis of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204255

Auctioning Supply Contracts

Chen, Fangruo - In: Management Science 53 (2007) 10, pp. 1562-1576

-sharing contracts in procurement auctions, the scenarios where the buyer and suppliers may possess asymmetric information about the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204434

Revenue Ranking of Discriminatory and Uniform Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders

Aleksandar Saša Peke\v{c}; Tsetlin, Ilia - In: Management Science 54 (2008) 9, pp. 1610-1623

An important managerial question is the choice of the pricing rule. We study whether this choice depends on the uncertainty about the number of participating bidders by comparing expected revenues under discriminatory and uniform pricing within an auction model with affiliated values, stochastic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204596