Product design decisions substantially affect the cost and revenue drivers. A design configuration with commonality can lower manufacturing cost. However, such a design may hinder the ability to extract price premiums through product differentiation. We explicitly investigate the...

We examine a supply chain in which the final product consists of components made by a buyer and a supplier. In the single moral-hazard case, the buyer's quality is observable, whereas in the double moral-hazard case, the buyer's quality is not observable. The supplier's quality is not observable...

This paper examines the role of cost application in the presence of delay and agency costs. Two risk neutral division managers share a common (production) facility and decide on (a) the demand (usage) rates, and (b) productive action. Each division manager causes costly delays at the common...

We examine the buyer's problem of inducing the supplier's quality effort using two arrangements: the appraisal regime and the certification regime. In the appraisal regime, the buyer inspects the units supplied and either charges a penalty for defective units identified during inspection or pays...

Balachandran and Schaefer (1979) show that if in the individual optimum class A dominates with a first come first serve queue, there could exist cases where in the public optimum class B dominates. We derive conditions under which providing a nonpreemptive priority allows both classes of users...