This paper investigates the incentives for cooperation in market surveys among competitive firms. The analysis relies on a game theoretic model. The main conclusion is that the value of information in a competitive market exhibits a sharp decrease as the number of firms that share the...

The present paper generalizes the concept of perfect information to games in which the players, while moving sequentially, remain uncertain about the actual payoff of the game because of an initial chance move. It is proved that the value of such games with "almost" perfect information can still...

In this paper a game theoretic model is used to extend information value theory, as developed in decision analysis, to competitive situations. One of the main differences between competitive and noncompetitive situations is that part of the environment (namely the competitors) may be modified as...

An experiment is defined as a random variable which may take some posterior probability distributions according to a marginal probability. Elementary properties of this definition with respect to information value theory are derived as well as their practical implications.