When two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn,...

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...

In this paper we aim - through an ‘experimentally-adapted’ Contingent Valuation survey -to look into the attributes of Ghanaians’ willingness-to-pay for green products. This would help usaddressing two main issues: first, from a theoretical point of view, we shall assess whether...

This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playingthe Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives.We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with responsetime, whereas responders’ behavior is positively and significantlycorrelated. Hence,...

I examine how financial incentives interact with intrinsic motivation and especially cognitive abilities in explaining heterogeneity in performance. Using a forecasting task with varying cognitive load, I show that the effectiveness of high-powered financial incentives as a stimulator of...

This paper extends existing evidence on the interaction between financial incentives and cognitive capital. I focus on the impact of task-specific cognitive capital, the role of which is central to the capital-labor-production framework of Camerer and Hogarth (1999) and has long been studied in...

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensityis endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensityand consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined bythe maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almostexclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by materialincentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punishuntrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivatedplayers are...

Many decisions in economics and finance have to be made under severe time pressure. Furthermore, payoffs frequently depend on the speed of decision-making, like, for instance, when buying and selling stocks. In this paper, we examine the influence of time pressure and time-dependent incentive...

We consider a society composed of two regions. Each of them pro-vides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries.In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a regionare spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two...