According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1]. In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this...

Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. Therefore, the...

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive...

In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley...

In this article a new value for positive cooperative games is introduced. It generalizes the “proportional division of surplus” idea for two person games. A characterization by means of preservation of ratios and efficiency provides existence and uniqueness. Moreover, this value is the only...

A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...

This paper introduces a new class of cooperative games called externality games. In these games each player contributes with their specific endowment and also with their presence to the total worth of the coalition she belongs to. We prove that for these games there exists a unique efficient,...

We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship with graph communication situations and conference structures à la...

In this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axioms that are based on relational aspects in the interactions among players. Some of these relational aspects, in particular the economic or social interest of each player in cooperating with each other, can...