The Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game is reconsidered under the assumption that each player is loss averse and the associated reference point is equal to the highest turned down offer of the opponent in the past. This makes the payoffs and therefore potential equilibrium strategies...

The robustness of Aumann’s seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is considered. More precisely, we show by means of an example that two Bayesian agents with almost identical prior beliefs can agree to completely disagree on their posterior beliefs. Besides, a...

We consider bargaining problems under the assumption that players are loss averse, i.e., experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting condition on an outcome: an outcome z in a bargaining...

We present an epistemic model for games with perfect information in which players, upon observing an unexpected move, may revise their belief about the opponents' preferences over outcomes. For a given profile P of preference relations over outcomes, we impose the following conditions: (1)...