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On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price,specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, andform their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. Weformally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866446
We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers’and responders’ behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. Using a dualsystemapproach, we tax cognitive resources through time pressure andcognitive load to enhance the influence of affective processes on behaviour.We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866456
This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866534
We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish betweene±ciency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior.Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivityplayer to increase group payo®s when contributing positive amounts....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866570
Contrary to the models of deterministic life cycle saving, we take itfor granted that uncertainty of one's future is the essential problem ofsaving decisions. However, unlike the stochastic life cycle models, we capturethis crucial uncertainty by a non-Bayesian scenario-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866571
We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behaviorin an investment game. In one treatment, group identity isinduced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group membersare additionally related by outcome interdependence establishedin a prior public goods game. Moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866633