This paper presents an adjusted Faustmann Rule for optimal harvest of a forest in the presence of a social cost of carbon emissions. A contribution of the paper is to do this within theoretical and numerical frameworks that take account of the dynamics and interactions of the forest's multiple...

Countries with an active climate policy often use several other policy instruments in addition to a price on carbon emissions, such as subsidies to renewable energy. An obvious reason for subsidizing alternatives to carbon energy is that the price of carbon emissions is too low. The paper...

The focus of the green paradox literature has been either on demand-side climate policies or on effects of technological changes. The present paper addresses the question of whether there also might be some kind of green paradox related to supply-side policies, i.e. policies that permanently...

For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development...

Recent literature on biofuels has questioned whether biofuels policies are likely to reduce the negative effects of climate change. Our analysis explicitly takes into account that oil is a non-renewable natural resource. A blending mandate has no effect on total cumulative oil extraction....

This note gives a brief, non-rigorous sketch of basic optimal control theory, which is a useful tool in several simple economic problems,such as those in resource and environmental economics. While the mathematical analysis in the note is self-contained, there is not much explanation and...

When a monopolistic hydro producer interacts with a competitive thermal fringe, the short-run revenue function of the hydro monopolist is non-concave. This implies that even if the demand function is stationary, equilibrium prices may fluctuate through the year. For given capacities, both hydro...

In most models of transboundary pollution, lack of international cooperation does not cause any inefficiency within each country. The paper shows that this result is only valid in the hypothetical case of no international trade. With international trade, we get a domestic inefficiency in...

In the negotiations towards an agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, one of the issues negotiated will be the allocation of emissions (or tradable emission permits) between countries. In most analyses and policy discussions, it is usually taken for granted that each country would like...

We study climate policy when there are technological spillovers between countries, and there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon...