This paper explores water pricing policy in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, in a political economy perspective. I argue that current water prices are too low and significantly below long-run marginal cost, and demonstrate that water prices must be raised significantly over the next ten...

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in...

Trade with differentiated goods normally provides a form of insurance against disasters, such as floods and fires, through an increasing relative price of goods from the afflicted country. With open access renewable resources this is reversed. A country hit by a negative shock recovers faster if...

Understanding the effect of introducing property rights to natural resources is central in economics, but empirical analysis is frustrated by the complexity of socioecological systems. We construct a detailed bio-economic model of the Norwegian coastal cod fishery, which was closed after 1989,...

The bulk of acid depositions, which have harmful effects on the environment, are caused by foreign emissions in many European countries. Therefore, if some countries emit more acids, one cannot be sure that countries that emit less will benefit from reduced acid depositions. However, numerical...

Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to leave Russia and other Eastern European countries with market power in the market for emission permits. Ceteris paribus, this will raise the permit price above the competitive permit price. However, Russia is also a large exporter of fossil...

In most models of transboundary pollution, lack of international cooperation does not cause any inefficiency within each country. The paper shows that this result is only valid in the hypothetical case of no international trade. With international trade, we get a domestic inefficiency in...

We study climate policy when there are technological spillovers between countries, and there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon...

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country...

We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view...