Showing 1 - 9 of 9
In this note I show that pratically any increasing function is the equilibrium bidding function of a symmetric first-price auction. It is like a Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu for auctions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077074
We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for a multiproduct monopolist facing a market populated by consumers with budget constraints. Our main contribution is to show via examples and our existence result that, in general,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135131
In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413249
We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413265
We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413276
In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413285
Suppose a seller wants to sell $k$ similar or identical objects and there are $nk$ potential buyers. Suppose that buyers want only one object. (This is a reasonable assumption in the sale of condominiums or in the sale of government-owned residential units to low-income families). In this case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413286
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561775
In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility defined on an atomless space is concave.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561797