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Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2008

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774878

Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment

Gorton, Gary B. - 2008

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774972

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861

Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives

Lee, Jongsub - 2017

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941985

Executive Compensation and Incentives : the Impact of Takeover Legislation

Bertrand, Marianne - 2010

We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763822