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Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation : Theory and Evidence
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 2010
. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135269
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The Other Side of the Tradeoff : the Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Samwick, Andrew A. - 2021
The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance, yet the existing empirical evidence supporting it is quite weak. The key predication of the model is that the executive's pay-performance sensitivity is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215701
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Performance Incentives within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Samwick, Andrew A. - 2022
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308346