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Frydman, Carola - 2010

result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135394

Pay Cuts for the Boss : Executive Compensation in the 1940s

Frydman, Carola - 2011

Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089

Do Private Equity Managers Earn Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance

Robinson, David T. - 2014

productivity of manager skills, and in which managers with higher compensation earn back their pay by delivering higher gross …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066311

The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency : Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover

Gorton, Gary B. - 2009

Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159958

Executive Compensation : Facts

Clementi, Gian Luca - 2010

In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549

Do CEOS Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do

Bertrand, Marianne - 2006

We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783957

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012786483

Globalization and Executive Compensation

Keller, Wolfgang - 2017

This paper finds that globalization is contributing to the rapid increase in executive compensation over the last few decades. Employing comprehensive data on top executives at major U.S. companies, we show that their compensation is increasing with exports and foreign direct investment, as well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956923

Executive Compensation : A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005

Frydman, Carola - 2010

We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759098

Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment?

Gibbons, Robert - 2010

Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time all the revenues are realized. We present evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760141