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The Dark Side of Outside Directors : Do They Quit When They are Most Needed?

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2015

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038902

Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2010

no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013151644

Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?

Fabisik, Kornelia - 2018

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906766

Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument

Becker, Bo - 2011

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically … to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public …. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120315