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Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 2007

information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778097

A General Rationale for a Governmental Role in the Relief of Large Risks

Shavell, Steven - 2014

The government often provides relief against large risks, such as disasters. A simple, general rationale for this role of government is considered here that applies even when private contracting to share risks is not subject to market imperfections. Specifically, the optimal private sharing of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052679

Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change

Shavell, Steven - 2014

This article develops two points. First, insurance against the risk of legal change is largely unavailable, primarily … legal change, it is generally desirable for legal change to be attenuated. Specifically, in a model of uncertainty about two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059102

Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability

Shavell, Steven - 2022

incentives to reduce risk of various ways of treating such uncertainty under the liability system are identified using a …Situations in which there is uncertainty over the cause of harm are studied (e.g., was the lung cancer due to normal … (if their probability of causation systematically fell below the threshold) and thus do too little to reduce risk; or they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322861

Corrective taxation versus liability

Shavell, Steven - In: The American economic review 101 (2011) 3, pp. 273-276

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261663

A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell - In: The American economic review 81 (1991) 3, pp. 618-621

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001107487

The Corrective Tax Versus Liability as Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities

Shavell, Steven - 2010

importance in controlling harmful externalities. I compare the tax and liability here in theory and suggest that the conclusions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139749

Corrective Taxation Versus Liability

Shavell, Steven - 2010

Taxation and liability are compared here as means of controlling harmful externalities. It is emphasized that liability has an advantage over taxation: inefficiency of incentives arises under taxation when, as would be typical, it would be impractical for a tax to reflect all variables that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139750

Optimal Cleanup and Liability after Environmentally Harmful Discharges

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 2011

This article studies how liability for environmentally harmful discharges affects the incentives of firms to engage in cleanup and invest in precautions, as well as the incentives of consumers to purchase the goods whose production leads to discharges. Our main conclusion is that making firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124354

Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 2012

A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that party. However, this principle is not correct when account is taken of litigation costs, because they too are part of the social costs associated with an injury. In this article we examine the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096854