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Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763767
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890898
This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant-level scale economies are small and market power is not an issue. At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model distinguishes between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213411
new ones. Thus, a multi-pronged reform agenda, sustained by a supportive political climate, created an economy of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071909
factories, steam power was combined with unskilled labor, and managers likely performed a complex supervisory role that was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054510
This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774941
Universal banking is an alternative mechanism to a stock market for risk-sharing, for providing information for guiding investment, and for contesting corporate governance. In Germany, where the stock market has historically been small, banks hold equity stakes in firms and have proxy voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124511
Who should control the firm? What should be the firm's objective function? If contracts are incomplete, then the group of input providers that most needs their interests protected should be allocated control rights to the firm. Existing theories argue that the suppliers of capital are most in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763280
Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763829
This paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards - - and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year -- implying that top executives in Germany have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013218102