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. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135269
Based on two samples of high quality personality data for chief executive officers (CEOs), we use linguistic features extracted from conferences calls and statistical learning techniques to develop a measure of CEO personality in terms of the Big Five traits: agreeableness, conscientiousness,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986297
The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance, yet the existing empirical evidence supporting it is quite weak. The key predication of the model is that the executive's pay-performance sensitivity is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215701
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308346