We propose and test a theory of corporate liquidity management in which credit lines provided by banks to firms are a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting credit line revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior by firms. Firms with high liquidity risk...

We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge against future income shortfalls, reducing debt - quot;saving borrowing capacityquot; - is a more effective way of securing future...

We document capital misallocation in the U.S. investment-grade (IG) corporate bond market, driven by quantitative easing (QE). Prospective fallen angels -- risky firms just above the IG rating cutoff -- enjoyed subsidized bond financing since 2009, especially when the scale of QE purchases...

We show that cheap credit to impaired firms has a disinflationary effect. By helping distressed firms to stay afloat, “zombie credit” can create excess production capacity, and in turn, put downward pressure on markups and prices. We test this mechanism exploiting granular inflation and...

We analyze how regulatory constraints on household leverage—in the form of loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits—affect residential mortgage credit and house prices as well as other asset classes not directly targeted by the limits. Supervisory loan level data suggest that mortgage credit...

We argue that a firm's aggregate risk is a key determinant of whether it manages its future liquidity needs through cash reserves or bank lines of credit. Banks create liquidity for firms by pooling their idiosyncratic risks. As a result, firms with high aggregate risk find it costly to get...