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We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137302
The paper discusses several issues related to how monetary policy should be conducted in an era of price stability. Low inflation (with base drift in the price level) and price-level stability (without such base drift) are compared, and a suitable loss function (corresponding to flexible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219290
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213439
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157375
A credible target zone exchange rate regime with a given exchange rate band implies bounds on the amount of depreciation and appreciation of the domestic currency. This implies, for given foreign interest rates, bounds on the domestic-currency rate of return on foreign investment: a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324472