Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220814
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the e fficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are more efficient for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221989
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional --...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239161
Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240582
The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148374
In this paper we analyze empirically the most important implications of two family political economy models of inflation: the "myopic? government approach and the "weak" government approach. In myopic government models inflation is the deliberate outcome of politicians strategic behavior, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244087
This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences concerning fiscal policy alternate in office as a result of democratic elections. It is shown that in this situation government debt becomes a strategic variable used by each policymaker to influence the choices of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323574
In many countries. social security is a large fraction of the government budget. Why is it, given that at any moment in time the number of recipients of social security benefits is smaller than the number of contributors? Kore generally, what determines the size of social security? To answer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157873
This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and time profile of public spending. Potential disagreement between current and future majorities generates instability in the social choice function that aggregates individual preferences. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308356
Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226917