We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced … distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight …. Noise traders bias prices upward because constraints make it harder for managers to underweight overvalued assets, which …

control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are … higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate …

This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …

learning algorithm. The algorithm uncovers two distinct behavioral types: “leaders” and “managers”. Leaders focus on multi …-function, high-level meetings, while managers focus on one-to-one meetings with core functions. Firms with leader CEOs are on average …

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …

Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This …