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Pay Cuts for the Boss : Executive Compensation in the 1940s

Frydman, Carola - 2011

Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089

Executive Compensation : Facts

Clementi, Gian Luca - 2010

In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549

Globalization and Executive Compensation

Keller, Wolfgang - 2017

This paper finds that globalization is contributing to the rapid increase in executive compensation over the last few decades. Employing comprehensive data on top executives at major U.S. companies, we show that their compensation is increasing with exports and foreign direct investment, as well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956923

Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment?

Gibbons, Robert - 2010

Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time all the revenues are realized. We present evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760141

Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation

Graham, John R. - 2011

We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120991

Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges

Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012

In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668

Seeking Alpha : Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent

Acharya, Viral V. - 2013

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085052

CEO Centrality

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2008

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773127

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861

How Do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?

Shue, Kelly - 2019

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902373

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