control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are … higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate …

-country differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated … discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross …-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical …

We analyze a large-scale survey of owners, managers, and employees of small businesses in the United States to …

. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

Managerial delegation is essential for firm growth. While firms in poor countries often shun outside managers and …