‟s cash flows, and senior management's "gut feel." Corporate politics and corporate socialism are more important allocation …

, and market opportunities. This know-how can be reallocated across countries as managers acquire control of factors of …

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …

We empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management. We find strong evidence of … avoid econometric biases are insignificant. We also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over …

control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are … higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate …

-country differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated … discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross …-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical …

We analyze a large-scale survey of owners, managers, and employees of small businesses in the United States to …