This paper asks the question: can central bank transparency go too far? Transparency is beneficial only when it serves …, particularly a central bank announcement of its objective function or projections of the path of the policy interest rate, will … complicate the communication process and weaken support for a central bank focus on long-run objectives. Transparency can indeed …

procyclical impact of bank capital requirements. By contrast, central bankers in Germany and Japan clearly do not act as the …

Bank balance sheet lending is commonly viewed as the predominant form of lending. We document and study two margins of … document the limits of the shadow bank substitution margin: shadow banks substitute for traditional—deposit-taking—banks in … quantitative consequences of several policies on lending volume and pricing, bank stability, and the distribution of consumer …

and central bank conservatism on economic performance. Several striking conclusions emerge. In relatively centralized … of central bank conservatism. A radical-populist central banker who cares not at all about inflation (alternatively, who …

Although bank supervision under the National Banking System exercised a light hand and panics were frequent, depositor … losses were minimal. Double liability induced shareholders to carefully monitor bank managers and voluntarily liquidate banks …

We investigate the origins and growth of the Financial Stability Mandate (FSM) to examine why bank supervisors, inside … changes in the FSM, (2) whether supervision should be conducted within the central bank or in independent agencies and (3 …) whether supervision should be rules- or discretion/principles-based. As histories of bank supervision are few, we focus on the …