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This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer-Richard model of equilibrium tax rates, inequality, and income redistribution. We also extend that model to incorporate social preferences in the form of altruism and inequality aversion. The experiment varies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225000
This paper provides an algorithm for computing Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria (Maskin and Tirole, 1988a and b) for dynamic models that allow for heterogeneity among firms and idiosyncratic (or firm specific) sources of uncertainty. It has two purposes. To illustrate the ability of such models to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013230623
Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246299
Different beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income inequality, influence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But the composition of income in the first place depends on equilibrium tax policies. If a society believes that individual effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134300
The current debate in Western Europe centers on the relationship between economic and political integration. To address this problem, we construct a simple general equilibrium model in which the returns to trading are directly affected by the availability of a public good. In our model,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138063
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100994
Why are public-sector workers so heavily compensated with pensions and other non-pecuniary benefits? In this paper, we present a political economy model of shrouded compensation in which politicians compete for taxpayers' and public employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083093
The political left turn in Latin America, which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more, challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior. This paper generalizes the forward-looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic, non-concave income...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074913
The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants whose birth rates exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152617
Does an observation constitute stronger evidence for a theory if it was made after rather than before the theory was … formulated, when it may have influenced the theory's construction? Philosophers have discussed this question (of quot … and then constructs a theory) versus structural models with formal econometric tests (where a model is constructed before …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776741