the risk/incentive tradeoff and the question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient … conform to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

theory of agency, notably income insurance and multi-task considerations, also shape pay policies. The conclusion we draw …

incentives to reduce risk of various ways of treating such uncertainty under the liability system are identified using a … a criterion for determining liability may adversely affect behavior: parties might face a diminished burden of liability … (if their probability of causation systematically fell below the threshold) and thus do too little to reduce risk; or they …

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …

Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had …