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Pay for Percentile
Barlevy, Gadi - 2011
We analyze an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122652
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The Economics of Identity and the Endogeneity of Race
Bodenhorn, Howard - 2010
Economic and social theorists have modeled race and ethnicity as a form of personal identity produced in recognition of the costliness of adopting and maintaining a specific identity. These models of racial and ethnic identity recognize that race and ethnicity is potentially endogenous because...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012762773
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Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
Bruegemann, Bjoern - 2015
The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016648
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Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?
Ehrenberg, Ronald G.; Bognanno, Michael L. - 2021
Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his output or rank, relative to other competitors. Such models are of more than academic Interest as they may well describe the compensation structures applicable to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239367
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Confidence Management in Tournaments
Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - 2022
An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire’s type differs from the true underlying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013292916
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Crowdsourcing City Government : Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy
Glaeser, Edward L. - 2016
Can open tournaments improve the quality of city services? The proliferation of big data makes it possible to use predictive analytics to better target services like hygiene inspections, but city governments rarely have the in-house talent needed for developing prediction algorithms. Cities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995969
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A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection
Netzer, Nick - 2012
We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099130
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The Heterogeneous Effect of Affirmative Action on Performance
Bracha, Anat - 2018
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of gender-based affirmative action (AA) on performance in the lab, focusing on a tournament environment. The tournament is based on GRE math questions commonly used in graduate school admission, and at which women are known to perform worse on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906801
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On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments : Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments
List, John A. - 2014
. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory … test of the theory implements a laboratory experiment, where important features of the theory can be exogenously imposed … models to inform us of the relevant theoretical predictions. In both cases we find that the theory has a fair amount of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056205
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A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, Jerry; Stokey, Nancy L. - 2021
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232756