We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that investors cannot monitor markets continuously. We study how limit order markets absorb transient liquidity shocks, which occur when a significant fraction of investors lose their willingness and...

The paper studies the effect of the market's perceived exchange rate volatility on bid-ask spreads. The anticipated volatility is extracted from currency options data. An increase in the perceived volatility is found to widen bid-ask spreads. The direction of the effect is consistent with an...

Extreme market outcomes are often followed by a lack of liquidity and a lack of trade. This market collapse seems particularly acute for markets where traders rely heavily on a specific empirical model such as in derivative markets. Asset pricing and trading, in these cases, are intrinsically...

In a model with heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents facing margin constraints, we show how securities' required returns are characterized both by their betas and their margin requirements. Negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind, lowering risk-free rates and raising Sharpe...

We develop a dynamic agency model where payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout in order to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus...

We study an economy where the lack of a simultaneous double coincidence of wants creates the need for a relatively safe asset (money). We show that, even in the absence of asymmetric information or an agency problem, the private provision of liquidity is inefficient. The reason is that liquidity...

A principal provides budgets to agents (e.g., divisions of a firm or the principal's children) whose expenditures provide her benefits, either materially or because of altruism. Only agents know their potential to generate benefits. We prove that if the more "productive" agents are also more...

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When...