We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced … distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight …. Noise traders bias prices upward because constraints make it harder for managers to underweight overvalued assets, which …

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

30% of the value mutual fund managers add can be attributed to the firm's role in efficiently allocating capital amongst … its mutual fund managers. We find no evidence of a similar effect when a firm hires managers from another firm. We …

managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …