Showing 1 - 10 of 7,585
Structurally estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model using coverage ratios that include non-tariff barriers leads to biased parameter estimates. We develop a quot;protection for salequot; theoretical framework consistent with the data, by explicitly allowing for non-tariff barriers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755693
This paper employs a novel data set on lobbying expenditures to measure the degree of within-sector political … organization and to explore the determinants of the mode of lobbying and political organization across U.S. industries. The data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764629
We develop a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. In the political equilibrium. the interest groups bid for protection, and each group's offer is optimal given the offers of the others. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013229813
Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner's trade policies. We find that such unilateral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231406
Economists and political scientists have frequently attempted to determine whether trade policy-related political action takes place along factor-lines (such as capital versus labor, as implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem) or along industry-lines (as implied by models with imperfect factor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215706
This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman %u201Cprotection for sale (PFS)%u201D model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221328
sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by … pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industry, entry tends to erode such rents, but in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224852
The textile industry's political power stemmed from its importance in southern states plus the power of the Southern delegation in the U.S. Congress in the 1960s. The strongest resistance to the industry's pressure for protection came from the foreign policy interests of the Executive branch. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141711
investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The … with lobbying competition. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217953
We analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013218520