Similar Search Results

Kraft, Holger - 2013

(average) Tobin's Q increases with firm-level volatility. The significance mainly comes from R&D firms, which have more growth … options than non-R&D firms. By decomposing firm-level volatility into its systematic and unsystematic part, we document that … only idiosyncratic volatility has a significant effect on valuation. Second, we analyze the relation of stock returns to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085928

Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism

Morck, Randall - 2010

Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136737

Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders : Evidence from Two Natural Experiments

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2011

While staggered boards have been documented to be negatively correlated with firm valuation, such association might be due to staggered boards either bringing about lower firm value or merely reflecting the tendency of low-value firms to have staggered boards. In this paper, we use two natural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123700

Does Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence from Industry Shocks

Lamont, Owen A. - 2011

Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary in order to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of industry investment, or diversity.'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125911

Target Revaluation after Failed Takeover Attempts – Cash Versus Stock

Malmendier, Ulrike - 2012

Cash- and stock-financed takeover bids induce strikingly different target revaluations. We exploit detailed data on unsuccessful takeover bids between 1980 and 2008, and show that targets of cash offers are revalued on average by +15% after deal failure, whereas stock targets return to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104060

A Theory of Debt Maturity : The Long and Short of Debt Overhang

Diamond, Douglas W. - 2012

Debt maturity influences debt overhang: the reduced incentive for highly- levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter-term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105007

How Much Do Firms Pay as Bribes and What Benefits Do They Get? Evidence from Corruption Cases Worldwide

Cheung, Yan-Leung - 2012

We analyze a hand-collected sample of 166 prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock markets that have been reported to have bribed government officials in 52 countries worldwide during 1971-2007. We focus on the initial date of award of the contract for which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107995

Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency

Almazan, Andres - 2014

We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065245

The Global Rise of Corporate Saving

Chen, Peter - 2017

The sectoral composition of global saving changed dramatically during the last three decades. Whereas in the early 1980s most of global investment was funded by household saving, nowadays nearly two-thirds of global investment is funded by corporate saving. This shift in the sectoral composition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963739

The Dark Side of Outside Directors : Do They Quit When They are Most Needed?

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger - 2015

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038902

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last