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Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?
Gabaix, Xavier - 2006
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779748
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Finance and Governance in Developing Economies
Morck, Randall - 2011
Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128601
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The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets : Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment
Scharfstein, David S. - 2008
We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an … bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774955
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Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation : Theory and Evidence
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 2010
. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135269
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CEO Compensation
Frydman, Carola - 2010
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135394
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Pay Cuts for the Boss : Executive Compensation in the 1940s
Frydman, Carola - 2011
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges
Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012
In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers
Lim, Jongha - 2013
managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084738
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Executive Compensation : Facts
Clementi, Gian Luca - 2010
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549
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Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power : A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation"
Weisbach, Michael S. - 2007
This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's quot;Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensationquot;. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778036