We formalize the Keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations. When production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand, optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic...

This paper studies how financial information frictions can generate sentiment-driven fluctuations in asset prices and self-fulfilling business cycles. In our model economy, exuberant financial market sentiments of high output and high demand for capital increase the price of capital, which...

This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of asset pricing in which profitable informed trading can occur without any "noise" added to the model. It shows that models of profitable informed trading must restrict the portfolio choices of uninformed traders: in particular, they cannot...

This paper reconsiders the Phelps-Lucas hypothesis, according to which temporary real effects of purely nominal disturbances result from imperfect information, but departs from the assumptions of Lucas (1973) in two crucial respects. Due to monopolistically competitive pricing, higher-order...

In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of human capital are an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two sectors, one where output is produced by teams and another where individuals can work alone. When workers' abilities...

This paper derives a second-order approximation to the solution of a general class of discrete- time rational expectations models. The main theoretical contribution of the paper is to show that for any model belonging to the general class considered, the coefficients on the terms linear and...

We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others' private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But...

This paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage. Under specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover. In addition, aggregate demand...

How does investors' information about a country's fundamentals, and the fact that this information may be asymmetrically held, affect a country's financing cost? Motivated by this question, and by the observation that sovereign bonds are usually auctioned in large lots to a large number of...