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result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135394
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549
We study the extent to which decisions to expand firm size are associated with increases in subsequent CEO compensation. Controlling for past stock performance, we find a positive correlation between CEO compensation and the CEO's past decisions to increase firm size. This correlation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310266
In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247010
This paper uses stochastic simulation and my U.S. econometric model to examine the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments. Are the variances, covariances, and parameters in the model such as to favor one instrument over the other, in particular the interest rate over the money supply? The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228257
This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's quot;Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensationquot;. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778036
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779748
In this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787508
We studied the relation of CEO pay and turnover to performance and characteristics of companies in a new data set that covers large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. As experience increases, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767096