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Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159958
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013233722
-country differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated … discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross …-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012752689
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135394
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
productivity of manager skills, and in which managers with higher compensation earn back their pay by delivering higher gross …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066311
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150549
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783957
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012786483
This paper finds that globalization is contributing to the rapid increase in executive compensation over the last few decades. Employing comprehensive data on top executives at major U.S. companies, we show that their compensation is increasing with exports and foreign direct investment, as well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956923