We develop a dynamic agency model where payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout in order to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus...

We show how the value of a real option depends on corporate income taxes and the option's "debt capacity," defined as the amount of debt supported or displaced by the option. The value of the underlying asset must be an adjusted present value (APV). The risk-free rate of interest must be...

This paper describes corporate investment and financing decisions when managers have inside information about the value of the firm's existing investment and growth opportunities, but cannot convey that information to investors. Capital markets are otherwise perfect and efficient. In these...

This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater explanatory power than a static...

Among the interesting changes in the U.S. economy in recent years have been the substantial changes in the age distribution of income and its components. These changes are interesting in and of themselves, but also are an important background against which to interpret aggregate economic...

This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and hold-up problems. We explore several financing scenarios, including first-best, monopolistic, syndicated and fully competitive financing. We...

This paper develops a signaling model in which accounting information improves real investment decisions. Pure cash flow reporting is shown to lead to underinvestment when managers have superior information but are acting in shareholders' interests. Accounting by prespecified,...

This paper contrasts the quot;static tradeoffquot; and quot;pecking orderquot; theories of capital structure choice by corporations. In the static tradeoff theory, optimal capital structure is reached when the tax advantage to borrowing is balanced, at the margin, by costs of financial distress....

This paper explores the effects of tax asymmetries on the value of risky capital investments made by corporations.The government's claim on the firm is shown to be equivalent to a portfolio of options on the firm's revenues. The tax law's provisions for carrying tax losses forward and backward...

This paper explores the necessary conditions for outside equity financing when insiders, that is managers or entrepreneurs, are self-interested and cash flows are not verifiable. Two control mechanisms are contrasted: a partnership,' in which outside investors can commit assets for a specified...