Douglass North asked why some societies historically and contemporarily have rising per-capita incomes and individual welfare, whereas others do not? He argued that successful economies had property rights that encouraged markets, trade, and investment in new production and organizational...

This paper introduces endogenous property rights into a neoclassical growth model. 1t identifies a mechanism that generates growth rates which are increasing at low levels of capital. and decreasing at high levels of capital. The driving force behind changes in property rights is the attempt of...

It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto...

Can granting IP protection to producers of one good affect the innovation rate in other related goods? To answer this question we exploit a unique policy experiment in the inter-war military aircraft industry. Airframe designs had little IP protection before 1926, but changes passed by Congress...

A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak. We present evidence that undue influence on courts is a common concern in many countries, especially...

How did citizens acquire rights protecting their property from the depredations of the government? In this paper, we argue that one important factor strengthening respect for property is how it is distributed. When there is some specificity associated with property, and property is held by those...

When parties can bargain with each other in an externality situation, it is frequently argued that liability rules are preferable to property rules. The case for liability rules is thought to be strongest when the parties behave strategically, when the collective authority responsible for...

This paper evaluates the importance of property rights institutions', which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and contracting institutions', which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions...

This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two 'quasi-natural experiments' in history, the division of...

Extending recent results in the industrial organization literature (Carvajal et al. 2013), we de-rive non-parametric tests of behavior consistent with the tragedy of the commons model. Our approach derives testable implications of such behavior under any arbitrarily concave, differentiable...