an information ea between management and outside shareholders. In the presence of such a gap, maximizing short-run and … actions that will reduce long-run value. In such a case, management faces the dilemma of which shareholders to please: those …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess … aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in … shareholders' collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that …

wealth maximization derived from shareholders' status as residual claimants are vulnerable on several fronts. Share … quasirents, expected earnings beyond expected costs of capital from investors, to which shareholders have no obvious claim. Other … made firm-specific investments, may exert stronger claims than atomistic public shareholders have to shares of their firms …

The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

errant top managers, or both …