The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...

We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract...

We analyze an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students....

Economic and social theorists have modeled race and ethnicity as a form of personal identity produced in recognition of the costliness of adopting and maintaining a specific identity. These models of racial and ethnic identity recognize that race and ethnicity is potentially endogenous because...

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his output or rank, relative to other competitors. Such models are of more than academic Interest as they may well describe the compensation structures applicable to...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire’s type differs from the true underlying...

Many important markets, such as the housing market, involve goods that are both indivisible and of budgetary significance. We introduce new graph theoretic techniques ideally suited to analyzing such markets. In this paper and its companion (Caplin and Leahy [2010]), we use these techniques to...

We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...

This paper proposes forward convergence as a model refinement scheme for linear rational expectations (LRE) models and an associated no-bubble condition as a solution selection criterion. We relate these two concepts to determinacy and characterize the complete set of economically relevant...