Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 859
Cover Image
Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression
Lamoreaux, Naomi R.; Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent - 2022
Legal records indicate that conflicts of interest -- that is, situations in which officers and directors were in a position to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders -- were endemic to corporations in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century U.S. Yet investors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324108
Cover Image
Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge
Becker, Bo - 2012
We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111307
Cover Image
Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
Becker, Bo - 2011
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120315
Cover Image
How Much Does Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach
Reuter, Jonathan - 2010
The level of diseconomies of scale in asset management has important implications for tests of manager skill and the expected level of performance persistence. To identify the causal impact of fund size on future returns, we exploit the fact that small differences in returns can cause discrete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138476
Cover Image
Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?
Giroud, Xavier - 2010
By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012757546
Cover Image
Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression
Holderness, Clifford G. - 2008
We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774898
Cover Image
Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany
Kaplan, Steven N. - 2021
to sales growth and earnings growth. Turnover of the supervisory board is not consistently related to any measure of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013218102
Cover Image
How Do CEOS See Their Role? Management Philosophy and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms
Mullins, William - 2014
Using a survey of 800 CEOs in 22 emerging economies we show that CEOs' management styles and philosophy vary with the control rights and involvement of the owning family and founder: CEOs of firms with greater family involvement have more hierarchical management, and feel more accountable to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063090
Cover Image
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges
Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012
In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
Cover Image
Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide
Artiga González, Tanja - 2013
unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than … managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms … engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085128