Conventional wisdom holds that lack of government commitment deters foreign investment in developing countries. Yet this explanation is not convincing because some econometric studies have found little support for the role of political risk and host governments can offer upfront subsidies that...

The purpose of this paper is to model the role of trade dependency in determining the access of a developing economy to the international credit market, and its desirable growth strategy. With full integration of capital markets the choice with respect to the inwardness of a technology is...

We quantify the role of financial leverage behind the sluggish post-crisis investment performance of European firms. We use a cross-country firm-bank matched database to identify separate roles for firm leverage, bank balance sheet weaknesses arising from sovereign risk, and aggregate demand...

We develop a stylised model of multiple equilibria, with country risk spreads at the focus of the analysis. Fears that the country default on its debt triggers a reversal in the direction of inflows of international financial capital raise interest-rate spreads and thus the cost of servicing the...

This paper analyzes the international reserve-holding behavior of developing countries. It shows that political-economy considerations modify the optimal reserve level determined by efficiency criteria. A country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax...

A traditional explanation for why sovereign governments repay debts is that they want to keep good reputations so they can easily borrow more. Bulow and Rogoff show that this argument is invalid under two conditions: (i) there is a single debt relationship, and (ii) regardless of their past...

We propose a new, valuation-based measure of world equity market segmentation. While we observe decreased levels of segmentation in many developing countries, the level of segmentation is still significant. In contrast to previous research, we characterize the factors that account for variation...

This paper presents a continuous-time model of sovereign debt. In it, a relatively impatient sovereign government's hidden type switches back and forth between a commitment type, which cannot default, and an optimizing type, which can default at any time, and assume outside lenders have...

We provide methods of decomposing the variance of world national incomes into components in such a way as to indicate the most important risk-sharing opportunities, and, therefore, the most important missing international risk markets to establish. One method uses a total variance reduction...

The valuation of government debt is subject to strategic uncertainty, stemming from investors' sentiments. Pessimistic lenders, fearing default, bid down the price of debt. This leaves a government with a higher debt burden, increasing the likelihood of default and thus confirming the pessimism...