Regression discontinuity designs (RDDs) are a popular method to estimate treatment effects. However, RDDs may fail to yield consistent estimates if the forcing variable can be manipulated by the agent. In this paper, we examine one interesting set of economic models with such a feature....

Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically...

In this paper, we study the identification and estimation of a dynamic discrete game allowing for discrete or continuous state variables. We first provide a general nonparametric identification result under the imposition of an exclusion restriction on agent payoffs. Next we analyze large sample...

We propose a method for estimating static games of incomplete information. A static game is a generalization of a discrete choice model, such as a multinomial logit or probit, which allows the actions of a group of agents to be interdependent. Unlike most earlier work, the method we propose is...

We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute...

Recently, empirical industrial organization economists have proposed estimators for dynamic games of incomplete information. In these models, agents choose from a finite number actions and maximize expected discounted utility in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Previous econometric methods estimate...

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse' arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

This paper studies the asymptotic relationship between Bayesian model averaging and post-selection frequentist predictors in both nested and nonnested models. We derive conditions under which their difference is of a smaller order of magnitude than the inverse of the square root of the sample...

Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes...

We study a variant of a random utility model that takes a probability distribution over preference relations as its primitive. We do not model products using a space of observed characteristics. The distribution of preferences is only partially identified using cross-sectional data on varying...