We explore a framework that could be used to assign quantitative allocations of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), across countries, one budget period at a time. Under the two-part plan: (i) China, India, and other developing countries accept targets at Business as Usual (BAU) in the coming...

The UNFCCC process of negotiating multilateral carbon emissions reductions thus far has focused on approximately equiproportional cuts in annual carbon emissions by country along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol agreement. But now, with the objective of involving large developing countries such...

This paper develops a theoretical foundation for the social cost of carbon (SCC). The model highlights the source of debate over whether countries should use the global or domestic SCC for regulatory impact analysis. I identify conditions under which a country's decision to internalize the...

We report numerical simulation results using a multiyear global multi country modeling framework which we use to assess the impacts of alternative emissions cuts which will likely come under consideration for the process to follow the December 2009 UNFCCC negotiation in Copenhagen. The...

A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly...

This study reviews different approaches to the political and economic control of global public goods like global warming. It compares quantity-oriented control mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with price-type control mechanisms such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. The pros and cons...

It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating many different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally-binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self-interest by incentivizing...